

Constructive Intrinsic Valuation

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Abstract. In this paper I define and defend a valuing stance that I call Constructive Intrinsic Valuation. In cases of Constructive Intrinsic Valuation it can be appropriate for someone to value x intrinsically, even if x doesn't possess intrinsic value. I characterize this stance by contrasting it with two more familiar types of appropriate intrinsic valuation: valuing something intrinsically because you recognize an ethical duty to do so, and valuing something intrinsically because you think its value is (in a certain sense) unconnected from anything else. After defending the coherence of Constructive Intrinsic Valuation, I explain its importance. There are things some of us value intrinsically, but that we cannot confidently ascribe intrinsic value to. My account shows how it may still be appropriate to value such things intrinsically even while the uncertainty remains.

1. Introduction

What attitude should you have towards something valuable? The short answer is: if x is valuable then you should value x . And this entailment is biconditional: it is also the case that if you should value x then x is valuable. There is a debate about which of the relata in this relation comes first. When it's appropriate to value x is this grounded in the fact that x is valuable? Or is it the case that what it means for x to *have value* is just that x is the kind of thing it is appropriate to *value*?¹ Whatever the case, the biconditional seems to hold necessarily. Necessarily, if you should value x , then x is valuable, and *vice versa*. In this paper I define

¹ This is the question addressed in debates over the 'fitting attitude' analysis of value, sparked by Thomas Scanlon's revival of that analysis with his 'buck-passing' account of value, in *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Belknap, 1998); see for example Wlodek Rabinowicz and Jan Österberg, 'Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons', *Philosophical Quarterly* 56 (2006): 114-20; Krister Bykvist,

and defend a form of *intrinsic* valuation in which the corresponding biconditional truism doesn't hold. It can be appropriate for someone to value *x* intrinsically, even if *x* doesn't have intrinsic value. What makes such intrinsic valuation appropriate, when it is, is that it helps with attaining *x*'s extrinsic benefits. Sometimes the magnitude of the extrinsic benefits or the likelihood of them being attained (or both) are greater if an agent values *x* intrinsically instead of extrinsically. I call this *Constructive Intrinsic Valuation* (CIV).

I begin in §2 by expanding on this characterization of CIV. In §3 I discuss how CIV exemplifies more general features of practical reasoning. And in §4 I explain why, contrary to initial appearances, CIV needn't involve any inconsistency in one's attitudes.

That's the first half of the paper. In the second half, §§5-7, I explain why CIV is a helpful addition to our conceptual toolkit for thinking about intrinsic value and intrinsic valuation. Here's the view in a nutshell. There are all sorts of things that we value intrinsically, but which we can't – or at any rate, shouldn't – impute intrinsic value to with any real confidence or conviction. Think of how I might value an artwork. It's not that I think I have a *duty* to see it as a bearer of intrinsic value, the way I have a moral duty to recognize intrinsic value in other people. Nor is it that I can't conceive of there being further things from which the artwork derives its value. Indeed, its extrinsic benefits – like the pleasure I get in looking at it – are part of why I value it. But still, on reflection it seems to me that it isn't for the sake of these benefits that I value the artwork. I don't value it *extrinsically*. Rather, to use the familiar phrase, I value it 'in and of itself'. Now, maybe this just a mistake. After all, how can I be justified in valuing an artwork intrinsically if, by my own lights, I lack any good grounds for seeing it as a bearer of intrinsic value? CIV is a useful concept because it shows how it's at least *possible* to be reasonable in valuing something intrinsically even while being doubtful about whether it possesses intrinsic value. If we want to make judicious all-things-considered judgments about whether people are being reasonable in valuing things intrinsically, we need CIV as an item in our conceptual repertoire.

I expand on this in §7. In building up to it, I first need to explain what makes intrinsic valuation an appropriate attitude in the paradigm case, where someone values *x* intrinsically because she judges that *x* possesses intrinsic value. This will require a clarification of what it means to judge that *x* has intrinsic value, in §5, and of what it means to value *x* intrinsically, in §6. The idea that these are in fact separate things, rather than different facets of the same attitude, is a point I will argue for along the way, primarily in §4.

¹'No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails', *Mind* 118 (2009): 1-30; Franceso Orsi, 'What's Wrong With Moorean Buck-Passing?', *Philosophical Studies* 164 (2013): 727-46.

2. The structure of constructive intrinsic valuation

Suppose there is an object or state of affairs, x , which has the potential to be of value to an agent, A , but where the value that x has for A derives from some further thing, y , to which x conduces or is related. In such cases we standardly say x is *extrinsically* valuable to A . But suppose x is extrinsically valuable to A in a special way: x will have more extrinsic value if A values it intrinsically – if she values x for its own sake, not just for the sake of y .

Given these stipulations it is an interesting question whether it is appropriate for A to value x intrinsically or extrinsically. The answer seems to be: both. If A wants to receive as much of x 's value as possible she should value x intrinsically, since more of x 's extrinsic value will come her way if she does. But if A wants her valuing attitude to accurately represent the nature of the value x has for her, then she should value x extrinsically, since x 's value to A ultimately is extrinsic. Either way, A can't obtain the full value of x while simultaneously having a valuing stance that accurately reflects the nature of x 's value to her. But if receiving value is a higher priority for A than valuing accurately, then she should value x intrinsically. And if it's permissible for A to order her priorities this way – as seems plausible – then it will be permissible for A to intrinsically value x in a case like this.

Here is a toy example to illustrate. Imagine that Ann gives Bek a trinket, and then some time later wants to see whether Bek really cherishes it. To do this, Ann arranges for a third party, Carol, to offer to buy the trinket from Bek for \$1000. If Bek accepts the offer, Ann has instructed Carol to immediately renege so that Bek gets nothing. But if Bek *refuses* the offer, Ann will reward her by giving her \$1000 (and letting her keep the trinket too). The idea in the example is that Bek's decision about whether to sell the trinket reveals her valuing stance. If she values the trinket extrinsically then she'll be willing to sell, but if she values it intrinsically, she won't. Granting these stipulations we have a case where the trinket will have significant *extrinsic* value for Bek as long as she values it *intrinsically*.

This case works as it does because Ann has gerrymandered the payoff conditions. But cases with similar payoff conditions occur without any gerrymandering. Consider the study of abstruse questions in the humanities, like in many of areas of philosophy. Suppose a student, Doris, is taking a course in philosophy, and that her main underlying reason for this is to improve her critical thinking abilities. Now consider two ways that Doris's approach to studying philosophy might play out. Case 1: imagine that in her study Doris is preoccupied with concerns about how well her skills are being developed through her working on the specific topics that she's been assigned and the assessment tasks that she's been given. In other words, imagine that Doris approaches her study in a mindset of extrinsic valuation. Case 2: now imagine that Doris instead devotes her attention wholeheartedly to the problems she's studying, working on them as if 'getting to the

bottom of things' was all that mattered about the exercise. In other words, imagine Doris approaches her study as if she was exclusively interested in whatever intrinsic value philosophy might hold.

The irony is that Doris can expect a greater improvement in her critical thinking skills in Case 2, when she approaches her study in a way that indicates an indifference to this extrinsic benefit. With regards to extrinsic benefits to critical thinking that come via philosophical study, the magnitude of the benefits and the likelihood of them being attained both tend to be greater if the student approaches the subject seeking its intrinsic value, rather than just trying to attain the extrinsic benefits. Or so we philosophy teachers often find. Philosophical study calls for a kind of *double-minded* valuing stance. At least some of the value of philosophical study is extrinsic, and so, given a perspective that prioritizes this consideration, it seems appropriate to value it extrinsically. In trying to obtain the extrinsic value, however, the student does better to adopt a stance of intrinsic valuation, and hence – from this second perspective – intrinsic valuation seems appropriate.²

This is the kind of case that calls for CIV. One adopts this stance by valuing something intrinsically, while recognizing that one's main reasons for doing so concern the attainment of the thing's extrinsic value. Because the extrinsic value is what anchors the valuation, it's possible in cases of CIV to value something intrinsically while being uncertain or doubtful about whether it possesses intrinsic value. There are many things other than philosophical study that are fitting objects of CIV, i.e. for which it's true that we do better at attaining their extrinsic value if we value them intrinsically. This is true of various kinds of aesthetic pursuits in the arts and literature, both creation and appreciation. It's also true of various types of exercise – team sports, jogging, and fitness activities like Yoga and martial arts. It's also true of various goods linked to relationships: friendships, interest-based clubs and societies, and romantic relationships. Much of the value that we find in romantic relationships is extrinsic. But our ability to enjoy that value is jeopardized if we come to the relationship in a mindset that's preoccupied with obtaining extrinsic benefits. The extrinsic benefits of relationships generally require that I value my partner intrinsically.

² For a nuanced analysis of the prospects of trying to show that the humanities possess intrinsic value, see Chapter 5 of Helen Small, *The Value of the Humanities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

3. Constructive intrinsic valuation and practical reason

Much of what I'm saying here is really just a way of using the vocabulary of 'valuation' to articulate a familiar insight about practical reason. Gilbert Harman states the idea like this: "it is often useful, for reasons of efficiency, to develop an intrinsic interest in something in which one already has an instrumental interest, for example, money or physical fitness".³ More recently Thomas Hurka discusses how this kind of valuing stance works when someone is trying to develop a refined ability, like becoming a skilled writer. "You're more likely to keep going through the initial frustrations" he says, "if you have other supporting motivations, such as a desire to write fiction for its own sake" – and especially so if the intrinsic aims are your main motivation "and your interest in pleasure is only secondary".⁴

Related to Hurka's example, notice that in cases where pleasure is the main extrinsic benefit that comes with valuing something for its own sake, CIV can be understood as a kind of tactical response to the paradox of hedonism. If I want pleasurable experiences it is a mistake to pursue them directly, because they're generally more likely to occur as an indirect by-product of my pursuit of other goods or ideals.⁵ The hedonist thus has to try to stabilize a complex valuing stance toward the activities or objects that are, for him, the focus of his (indirect) pursuit of pleasure. His ultimate reason for valuing these things is the pleasure they generate. But in order for that to occur, he needs to try to value them in a manner that is indifferent – at least in the immediate circumstances – to whether they conduce to pleasure. This complex valuing stance is indicative of how CIV works in general.

Although this kind of valuing stance isn't commonly discussed in the literature on intrinsic value, a number of ethicists on top of those already mentioned have discussed it or things resembling it. Harry Frankfurt says we sometimes value things intrinsically not because we ascribe them intrinsic value but because we have a need to have things that we care about in a deep and ardent way.⁶ Peter Railton defends a 'holistic teleological' account of how consequentialists can value friendship, and the kind of bifurcated perspective on the value of friendship that Railton attributes to the sophisticated consequentialist – where friendship

³ Gilbert Harman, 'Practical Reasoning', *The Review of Metaphysics* 29 (1976): 431-63, 460.

⁴ Thomas Hurka, *The Best Things in Life: A Guide to What Really Matters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 48-49.

⁵ As famously described in Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics* 7th Edn (London: Macmillan, 1907).

⁶ Harry Frankfurt, 'The Importance of What We Care About', *Synthese* 53 (1982): 257-72.

something valued for its own sake, *because* this will conduce to good ends – structurally resembles the complex of attitudes involved in CIV.⁷ In L. W. Sumner's presentation of an indirect consequentialist account of rights, he speaks about a form of 'rational irrationality' which involves the same kind of duality of perspective.⁸ And in Bernard Williams's discussion of norms of sincerity, the view that he advances about how it is that we come to intrinsically value sincerity – because this in turn conduces to extrinsic goods – is one that's built around something like the notion of CIV that I am presenting.⁹

These examples give us some reason to think that CIV is an appropriate valuing stance for us to take towards a non-trivial range of things. Notice, though, that the appropriateness of this valuing stance, when it is appropriate, owes less to the nature of the things whose value we're seeking to attain, and more to the nature of human beings as valuing agents. When CIV is appropriate, this is because agents like us do better at attaining the extrinsic value of things by valuing them intrinsically rather than extrinsically.

Why might this be the case? The best hypothesis, I think, is that competent extrinsic valuation is hard. It requires us to make accurate, complex, unsentimental judgments about the relative value of different kinds of things, and to modify our conduct (e.g. by prioritizing certain objects or activities) in a way that's sensitive to these judgments. For example, if I extrinsically value playing soccer because it helps me stay fit, and if I want to be a fully accurate extrinsic valuer, then what I ought to do, whenever I'm prioritizing soccer over other things, is assess the extent to which my current prioritization of soccer conduces to keeping me fit, and assess whether an alternative ordering of my priorities might do better. Most of us are disinclined to think about the things we value in this way, and most of us are bad at making the requisite judgments even when we are so inclined.¹⁰ People's general tendency is to be ardent, sentimental, and single-minded in the

⁷ Peter Railton, 'Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 13 (1984): 134-71.

⁸ L. W. Sumner, 'Chapter 6: Consequentialist Rights' in *The Moral Foundation of Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

⁹ Bernard Williams, 'Chapter 5: Sincerity: Lying and Other Styles of Deceit' in *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). In this passage Williams speaks of us 'constructing' intrinsic values. This is the source from which I've drawn my use of the term 'Constructive' to designate the species of intrinsic valuation that I'm characterizing.

¹⁰ Contemporary research on cognitive biases suggests that people do worse at making sound judgments about relative value when they're cognitively burdened. If extrinsic valuation is a more cognitively burdensome stance than intrinsic valuation, then it's a stance that beings like us are ill-suited to adopt, being more suited, as we are, to following relatively simple rules of thumb in our judgments and practical reasoning. Daniel Kahneman's *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2011) provides an accessible summary of the research on biases, cognitive load, and related topics over the last four decades.

things they care about. When I value soccer intrinsically I'm manifesting this tendency. I can single-mindedly commit to my soccer team and avoid fretting about how efficaciously my fitness is promoted by playing soccer. And in view of my human limitations this can all work out quite well. By being wholeheartedly devoted to my soccer team, I'm more likely to realize the extrinsic benefits that it promotes than if I came to soccer with a conscious mindset of extrinsic valuation.

4. Double-mindedness and the wrong kind of reasons

Even if there are good reasons for acknowledging CIV in principle, one might wonder how we can engage in CIV in practice, given that this stance requires the agent to hold seemingly inconsistent attitudes toward the thing being valued. Is it even possible for a person to value x intrinsically while conceding that x lacks intrinsic value, or while withholding judgment on the question of whether x possesses intrinsic value? I'll concede that there is at least something a bit odd about CIV. In §2 I said it was a 'double-minded' attitude. It's double-minded in that it merges two perspectives that are in tension with each other: an inside perspective, from which the agent values the thing for its own sake, and an outside perspective, from which the agent recognizes that her reasons for seeing the thing as she does, from the inside, are primarily about the attainment of the thing's value, rather than the accurate appraisal of its value. But again, one might ask: isn't it simply self-contradictory to attempt to hold these perspectives side-by-side, within the one valuing mindset?

One way to try to make this work would be to say that in cases of CIV, it's acceptable for A to toggle back and forth between these inside and outside perspectives on the valued thing, x , without ever affirming the contents of both simultaneously, and thus never simultaneously affirming any pair of attitudes about x 's value that lie in tension with each other. In the regular hurly-burly of life, A can just take the inside perspective on x and value x intrinsically. But in reflective moments A can shift to the outside perspective, from which she recognizes that the best justification for her valuing stance, in the inside perspective, is one that this perspective itself misrepresents. If A can slide between these two perspectives fluently (and for the record, I don't think that this kind of perspective-shifting is all that difficult or unusual),¹¹ then CIV needn't be compromised by its internal tensions.

That would be one way to try to sidestep the challenge. But it's probably better to try to meet the challenge head on. In the paradigmatic case of A intrinsically valuing x , A also judges that x has intrinsic value. If we think of that judgment as

¹¹ Adam Elga defends this kind of perspective-shifting based on what kind of reflective context one finds oneself in, in 'On Overrating Oneself... and Knowing It', *Philosophical Studies* 123 (2005): 115-24.

being not just a *typical* feature of intrinsic valuation, but a *necessary* feature, then CIV is an untenable valuing stance. However, the claim that valuing something necessarily involves judging it to have value is not plausible. After all, it seems possible that I can value x just by being positive-minded towards it, and it seems possible that this can occur regardless of whether I register a conscious judgment about x's value. Elizabeth Anderson allows the possibility of valuation under such a description. She says valuing something consists in having "a complex of positive attitudes toward it", while also being clear that "to experience something as valuable and to value it are *not to judge that it is valuable*".¹² David Velleman's account of what's involved in a valuing attitude contains further helpful insight related to this point. He says

We can regulate our responses... in light of the conditions that make them appropriate, by mustering or suppressing desire, admiration, amusement, and the like, as circumstances seem to warrant... a response regulated for appropriateness in this way is what constitutes valuing. To value something as desirable is... *not necessarily to judge it desirable*, but to desire it in a manner regulated with an eye to the conditions of appropriateness for desire.¹³

This allows, on one hand, that valuing x is primarily a volitional or *conative* state of mind, and hence that it doesn't necessarily involve having explicit beliefs about x's being valuable. At the same time, Velleman also acknowledges that there needs to be some kind of attitudinal regulation going on if a person's stance towards x is going to qualify as valuing x. When I merely have some nebulous pro-x demeanour, it's possible for this to just be an ephemeral whim, as opposed to my stable and enduring conative attitude towards x. In order to qualify as valuing x, then, my pro-x conative attitude needs a safeguarding mechanism whose operation keeps me positively-disposed towards x in a modally robust fashion.¹⁴

Here is a toy illustration. Suppose I am positively-minded towards my cat, Baxter, for the week after I adopt him from the shelter. But suppose that after that week, apropos of nothing, I stop being positively-minded towards him. Did I value Baxter during that week? No, not on the view that I'm endorsing. Although I *was* positively-minded towards Baxter – we might say 'I took a shine to him' – my attitudes turned out to be too flimsy and erratic to qualify as me valuing him. However, if something in my psychology kept me positively-minded towards Baxter in an ongoing and steadfast way, then that would make it the case that I did value

¹² Elizabeth Anderson, *Value in Ethics and Economics* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993): 2, my emphasis.

¹³ J. David Velleman, 'A Theory of Value', *Ethics* 118 (2008): 410-36, 411, my emphasis.

¹⁴ That is to say, positive-minded towards x not just under current conditions but under a range of other ('nearby') possible conditions. For a wide-ranging discussion of various kinds of cases in which we should, so the author argues, have this kind of modally robust valuing stance, see Philip Pettit, *The Robust Demands of the Good: Ethics with Attachment, Virtue, and Respect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

him. And this would be true even if it turned out that I never made a conscious judgment on the question of whether Baxter actually *possesses* value. What suffices for me valuing him is just that something keeps me positively-minded towards him, in view of whichever of his qualities elicit that attitude. It isn't necessary that I'm conscious of my positive-mindedness being regulated, only that this regulation is in fact occurring.

The upshot is that we have reason to reject the suggestion that intrinsically valuing x necessarily involves judging that x possesses intrinsic value. If it isn't the case that valuing x *per se* necessarily involves judging that x has value, then – absent some special reason to believe that things work differently in cases of *intrinsic* valuation – this supports the view that intrinsically valuing x doesn't necessarily involve judging that x has intrinsic value.

But here is another related worry. CIV as I've characterized it seems like it could be subject to a 'wrong-kind-of-reasons' problem. Although there is an intelligible reason for A to value x intrinsically in cases that exemplify the structure I've described, the reason is ostensibly just a prudential reason. The right kind of reason for to value x intrinsically, so one might want to say, is the reason that A has if she (correctly) judges that x possesses intrinsic value. Even if it's tactically advantageous for A to value x intrinsically in order to attain its extrinsic value, that doesn't make it *genuinely fitting* for A to intrinsically value x.

But this problem isn't fatal. First, if we unpack the standard version of the wrong kind of reasons problem, we see that it doesn't generate an objection to my account. In the standard version of the problem we imagine that a demon offers B a large external incentive to value some thing, x, which is in fact bad in its own right. What we see is that when B receives this prudential reason to value x, we still intuitively want to resist the conclusion that x has been *made valuable* as a result of the demon's machinations. And hence, the argument goes, being valuable cannot just be equated with being something that one has overall reason to value, as proponents of the buck-passing theory of value say.¹⁵ Now, if that's right, and if we apply that lesson to theories of intrinsic value, the upshot would be that being intrinsically valuable cannot be equated with being something that one has overall reason to value intrinsically. But that conclusion, if one wanted to make a case for it, would be consistent with everything in my account of CIV. It's no part of my account to claim that if x is a fitting object of CIV, this means x possesses intrinsic value. Quite the contrary, the main point of giving an account of CIV is to show how it can make sense to value something intrinsically even while being uncertain about whether that thing possesses intrinsic value. So the wrong kind of reasons problem seems to have no real purchase on this front.

¹⁵ See note 1.

The other way one might try to press a version of the wrong kind of reasons problem would be to claim (i) that it's ethically wrong to accept the demon's Faustian bargain, and to value the thing which is actually bad from an independent perspective, and then (ii) that the same kind of wrongful mis-valuation occurs in cases of CIV. However, even if we grant (i), CIV differs from the evil demon scenario in a way that undermines (ii). Consider again the example of studying philosophy in order to obtain extrinsic benefits in one's critical thinking abilities. The student has a prudential reason to value philosophy intrinsically, even though the value whose attainment underwrites this reason isn't philosophy's intrinsic value, but rather, its extrinsic value. Granted, there is a mismatch here. But it isn't the vicious mismatch we had in the demon example. The student isn't given a diabolical incentive to value something which is actually, from an independent perspective, bad. Rather, she has a strategic incentive to intrinsically value something whose value to her is extrinsic. The mismatch runs across the intrinsic-extrinsic divide, not the valuable-disvaluable divide. The intuition that it's wrong for A to value x for prudential reasons, in the evil demon case, owes to the fact that A would thereby be allowing extraneous incentives to *debase* her correct recognition of x's badness. But that isn't what's happening in the CIV case.

Perhaps this all seems a bit evasive. The essential worry here seems reasonable on its face. My positive-mindedness toward the things I value is accompanied – typically, even if not as a matter of necessity – by judgments about *whether the things I'm valuing are in fact valuable*. And if these sets of attitudes don't hang together in a way that's stable under reflection, something will have to give way. Now, it may well be true that in valuing x I typically can't avoid making some sort of judgment about x's value. However, the key point is that in a Constructive Intrinsic Valuation of x there is in fact a way to make a judgment about x's value, and have it be stable under reflection, *without* judging that x possesses intrinsic value. All I need is some judgment about x's value whose truth would suffice to make my positive-mindedness towards x intelligible to myself on reflection. So: suppose I just come to recognize that in intrinsically valuing x, despite being uncertain about whether x possesses intrinsic value, I'll do better at attaining x's extrinsic value. If this is how I understand x's value, this will make my positive-mindedness toward x intelligible to myself, and hence stable under reflection. These attitudes would only be unstable if I believed the following: that when it comes to whether I ought to value something intrinsically or extrinsically, the aptness of my mode of valuation is primarily determined by whether my stance accurately reflects the form of value that the thing possesses, and only secondarily, if at all, by whether it conduces to obtaining the thing's value. But I see no good reason to accept that thesis.

5. Two concepts of intrinsic value

As noted above, instances of CIV are not paradigm cases of appropriate intrinsic valuation. The paradigm case is one where I judge that *x* has intrinsic value and I value *x* intrinsically based on that judgment. When assessing whether someone is justified in intrinsically valuing *x*, the default, we might think, is to ask whether the paradigm is satisfied, i.e. whether *x* possesses intrinsic value. In this section I explain what's involved in judging that *x* possesses intrinsic value, and in §6 I explain what's involved in valuing *x* intrinsically. As we will see, it's reasonably clear, in purely schematic terms, why it makes sense to value *x* intrinsically if I've reached the judgment that *x* has intrinsic value. But it is harder to tell when I am justified in reaching that judgment. We're often unable to confidently ascribe intrinsic worth to the things we value. As I'll explain in §7, this is what makes CIV a helpful addition to our conceptual repertoire. It gives us another way to endorse instances of intrinsic valuation despite the uncertainty we face in judging which things possess intrinsic value. And it shows us another way of understanding what appropriate intrinsic valuation looks like, on top of the paradigm cases of appropriate intrinsic valuation that I will describe in §6.

So, what is the actual content of *A*'s view when she judges that *x* possesses intrinsic value? There are some timeworn methods philosophers have used to try to identify intrinsic value, and these shed some light on what it means to possess intrinsic value. The regress method, descended from Aristotle, tells us to contemplate something that's valuable *per se*, then ask what other thing this first thing derives its value from, then ask what that other thing derives its value from, and so on until we find we can go further, and all there is to say is: "*z* is just valuable, *period*".¹⁶ An alternative to this method is G. E. Moore's *isolation* method: imagine something existing in isolation in a universe, and ask whether that universe with its one resident thing has any value.¹⁷ Does a coat existing in isolation have any value? No. Coats only have value in being admired or used.¹⁸ Does a lone sentient being experiencing a state of pleasure have value? Maybe. It's less absurd to think pleasurable experiences can have value without being embedded in a wider network of events and states of affairs.¹⁹ Both methods aim to identify things whose

¹⁶ See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 3–4 (1094a).

¹⁷ The most direct statement of this approach in Moore's work is as follows: "to arrive at a correct decision" on the question of what has intrinsic value, he says, "it is necessary to consider what things are such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good"; G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965 [1903]): 187.

¹⁸ The example is from Christine Korsgaard, 'Two Distinctions in Goodness', *The Philosophical Review* 92 (1983): 169–95, 185.

¹⁹ For a discussion of how we might cash out the thesis that pleasure is intrinsically valuable, see Fred Feldman, 'On the Intrinsic Value of Pleasures', *Ethics* 107 (1997) 448–66.

value isn't inherited from anything beyond themselves. The thing isn't valuable because it's a part of a greater entity, or because it results in a further good. The source of the thing's value must be its own nature or properties, since there are no further things that it is linked to which explain its value.

Several authors writing about intrinsic value have argued that there is an ethical concept that gets called 'intrinsic value' but which differs from the kind of *un-derived* value suggested by the isolation and regress methods. Christine Korsgaard says that on top of the concept of *intrinsic* value, i.e. the value *x* has by dint of its intrinsic properties, we should recognize a concept of *final* value, i.e. the value that *x* is ascribed when it is valued not for the sake of something else, but *non-instrumentally*, for its own sake.²⁰ The two kinds of value can come apart. For example, a ball-bearing's value owes to its intrinsic properties (e.g. being spherical), but its value is entirely instrumental. The value of Martin Luther King's suit owes to its relational – and thus, non-intrinsic – properties (its having belonged to King), but the value it holds for us doesn't owe to its instrumental utility; rather, it is an end or final source of value in its own right. In a similar vein, Shelly Kagan argues against the idea that intrinsic value and non-instrumental value are the same thing. Whether something has value in virtue of its intrinsic properties is, Kagan says, a separate question from whether it has value as an instrument for other ends, or as a valued end in its own right.²¹

Ben Bradley proposes that the best way to classify the different concepts that we advert to using the term 'intrinsic value' is to distinguish the different functional roles in ethical theorizing that these concepts are called upon to fulfil.²² The notion of underived value that is suggested by the isolation and regress methods plays its primary role in ethical theories which – like Moore's theory – define right action in terms of some prior, independent account of the good.²³ One straightforward example of this is Classical Utilitarianism, which grounds its verdicts about right action in claims about the intrinsic value of pleasure. Many things appear to derive their value from the pleasure they bring. But when it comes to pleasure itself, it can seem as if there are no further good things one can advert to in order

²⁰ *Ibid.* For a defense of the view that intrinsic value is a matter of something's value obtaining in virtue of its intrinsic properties, see G. E. Moore, 'The Conception of Intrinsic Value' in *Philosophical Studies* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922).

²¹ Shelly Kagan, 'Rethinking Intrinsic Value', *The Journal of Ethics* 2 (1998): 277-97. A similar proposal is offered in Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, 'A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 100 (1999): 33-52.

²² Ben Bradley, 'Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 9 (2006): 111-30, 123.

²³ Or to put it another way, theories which – in Moore's words – posit that "the assertion 'I am morally bound to perform this action' is identical with the assertion 'This action will produce the greatest amount of possible good in the Universe'"; see *Principia Ethica*: 147.

to explain why pleasure is good.²⁴ Based on these sorts of judgments, the Classical Utilitarian views pleasure as intrinsically valuable, and defines right action as that which maximizes or promotes this intrinsic value. When claims about intrinsic value are used in this fashion, to describe the axiological foundations of an ethical theory that defines the right in terms of the good, Bradley calls this the *Moorean* concept of Intrinsic Value.²⁵

Bradley distinguishes this from what he calls the *Kantian* concept of intrinsic value, whose primary functional role is in ethical theories that define the ethical good in terms of some prior and independent characterization of right action. In this kind of ethical theory, intrinsic value is a property that we attribute to things that we judge it is impermissible to treat merely as means. The idea isn't so much that instrumentalizing *x* is wrong *because x* is intrinsically valuable. Rather, ascribing intrinsic value to *x* is a way of *marking* the verdict that instrumentalizing *x* is wrong. The verdict itself, for the Kantian, derives from independent claims about the categorical demands of reason, or about the requirements of mutual respect arising from one's membership in a moral community.²⁶ As Bradley puts it

By saying that something has intrinsic value, we are saying that it is not permissible to treat that thing... as something with merely instrumental value... the Kantian project leads one to think of intrinsic value as the sort of property that is possessed by people... not to be 'traded off' for other valuable things, cannot be added up and maximized, and so on.²⁷

²⁴ This isn't to suggest that 'pleasurable' is analytically equivalent to 'good'. The point of Moore's open question argument in *Principia Ethica* is to show that no non-moral properties are analytically equivalent to the property of goodness. For discussion of the open question argument in connection with the analysis of intrinsic value, see Michael J. Zimmerman, *The Nature of Intrinsic Value* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001): 77-83.

²⁵ Contemporary work on intrinsic value that operates within this kind of Moorean paradigm, broadly construed, includes Zimmerman, *The Nature of Intrinsic Value*, Noah Lemos, *Intrinsic Value* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Thomas Hurka, *Virtue, Vice, and Value* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Graham Oddie, *Value, Reality, and Desire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

²⁶ For an account of Kant's ethics built around claims about the demands of reason, see Onora O'Neill, *Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); for an account built on claims about the demands of mutual respect, see Stephen Darwall, *The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006).

²⁷ Bradley, 'Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value': 123. In calling this a Kantian concept of intrinsic value Bradley isn't saying this is the only understanding of intrinsic value that we ever find in Kantian ethics. Consider for instance Korsgaard's reading of Kant's statement – in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) – that a good will is the only thing with intrinsic value; the idea, on Korsgaard's account of it, is that "the good will is the one thing... for which the world is always a better place, no matter 'what it effects or accomplishes'"; see 'Two Distinctions in Goodness': 180. As Bradley notes, this sounds like the Moorean concept of intrinsic value, i.e. something that would have value in total isolation; see 'Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value': 126. But this is no problem. To call the non-Moorean concept of intrinsic value 'Kantian' is just to advert to the fact that the theoretical function fulfilled by this concept of intrinsic value (roughly:

Bradley's taxonomy helps address certain kinds of confusions that sometimes crop up in discussions of intrinsic value. The claim that human lives have intrinsic value is a familiar one in certain ethical debates. But if we're thinking of intrinsic value in the Moorean way – as a kind of value that's aggregable, scalar, necessary, and supervenient on intrinsic properties – that claim seems to carry theoretical baggage that's irrelevant or misleading (or both). Bradley's diagnosis is simple. The claim that human lives have intrinsic value is invoking the Kantian concept. The baggage is related to theories of Moorean intrinsic value. The two concepts of intrinsic value belong to different types of ethical theory, and while we can debate the merits of these different theories, the question of which concept of intrinsic value we should favor can be set aside once it's repositioned in this wider theoretical debate.²⁸

6. Paradigm cases of appropriate intrinsic valuation

To repeat, the paradigm case of appropriate intrinsic valuation is one in which A values x intrinsically *because* she judges that x possesses intrinsic value. We've now identified two concepts that might be in play when someone judges that x possesses intrinsic value. The next point to clarify is what's involved in valuing something intrinsically. As I said in §4, valuing a thing *per se* means, roughly, being steadfastly positively-minded towards it. But we all recognize that a person can be steadfastly positive-minded towards something – and *intensely* positive-minded towards it – without valuing it intrinsically. The zealous coveting of wealth as a means to happiness is one example. So what defines intrinsic valuation, if not intensity? On what I take to be the standard view, you value x intrinsically when you treat x as if its value is independent from other sources of value. Velleman espouses this type of view when he says intrinsic valuation is a positive-minded stance that “essentially involves a refusal to make comparisons, and an insistence on cherishing its object in isolation from others”.²⁹ Granted, this way

formulating principles that prohibit things from being used merely as means) is one that's central to Kantian ethics in its most familiar guise.

²⁸ Having said that, it may be that part of the substance of this broader metaethical debate is about the adequacy of the concepts of intrinsic value favored by proponents of either kind of ethical theory. For example, in his critique of Moore's metaethics one of Darwall's arguments is that Moorean intrinsic value is vacuous – that “there is no such thing as a brute ought to be”; see Stephen Darwall, ‘Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value’, *Ethics* 113 (2003): 468-89, 481. Note also that the correspondence between the two kinds of ethical projects and the two concepts of intrinsic value is probably messier than I've indicated. For example, while Chisholm defends an isolation approach to thinking about intrinsic value – which naturally dovetails with what I (following Bradley) call the Moorean ethical project – he endorses this because he thinks it “provides a way of reducing the concepts of the theory of value ('axiology') to those of ethics ('deontology')”, and thus aligns himself with the Kantian ethical project; see Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Defining Intrinsic Value’, *Analysis* 41 (1981): 99-100.

²⁹ J. David Velleman, ‘Beyond Price’, *Ethics* 118 (2008): 191-212, 200. In a similar vein, Carter says that intrinsic valuation “that which is valued becomes the whole world of the valuer... and forms an identity or oneness with the valuer; Robert Edgar Carter, ‘Intrinsic Value and the Intrinsic Valuer’, *Philosophy and*

of putting things flirts with overstatement. If it only counts as valuing *x* intrinsically if you will never – even in the teeth of catastrophe – compare *x*'s value to other things, then intrinsic valuation will be rare (and usually unwise). But Velleman's point is essentially right, all the same. Intrinsic valuation involves an *aversion* to making comparisons, and a *preference* for cherishing its object in isolation from others.

We can spell this out schematically. Suppose I value *x*, and suppose I'm given an opportunity to trade or sacrifice *x* for the sake of *y*. If I value *x* extrinsically, there is nothing in my valuing stance that weighs against me considering a trade of *x* for the sake of *y*. But there is something that weighs against entertaining this trade if I value *x* intrinsically. To put it another way, if I value *x* extrinsically there are no circumstances in which it is appropriate for me to *pre-emptively* dismiss an opportunity to use *x* as a mere means for attaining *y*. After all, the attainment of *y*'s value is my whole underlying reason for valuing *x*. However, if I value *x* intrinsically, then in at least some circumstances it is appropriate for me to pre-emptively dismiss opportunities to treat *x* as a mere means for other ends.

On its face, intrinsic valuation seems imprudent. Even if I'm ultimately not going to trade *x* for *y*, isn't it irrationally premature to refuse to even *entertain* a trade? Why not assess each case on its merits? Our two concepts of intrinsic value from §5, the Moorean and the Kantian, help us see why this valuing stance can be appropriate, in the paradigm cases in which I value *x* intrinsically because I judge that *x* possesses intrinsic value.

First, consider a case of Moorean Intrinsic Valuation. Suppose you think making art is intrinsically valuable in the Moorean sense. Its value isn't derived from another source of value. Making art is valuable, so you believe, just by virtue of its nature as an irreducibly worthwhile or positive activity. Does it make sense to prioritize or cherish art-making in a way that ignores comparisons, trades, sacrifices, etc.? Well, not always, but sometimes, yes. Compare with a case in which you're valuing something extrinsically, like, say, exercising for the sake of your health. When someone says: "if you care about your health, you would be better off scaling back the exercise and just getting more sleep", you should pay attention. You're exercising for the sake of your health, so if you have good reasons to believe that some alternative allocation of your energies would better promote your health, then you should drop the exercise and take the alternative. By contrast, if you regard art-making as intrinsically valuable, there is no analogous challenge to be made. You're not making art for the sake of anything else, so there's no independent court of appeal that someone can petition in to try to persuade you to deprioritize art-making in order to better advance your own ends. Now, it doesn't follow that it *always* makes sense to value art-making in a manner that

Phenomenological Research 34 (1974): 504-14, 514. (Carter is describing a view that he attributes to Robert S. Hartman, *The Structure of Value* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967).)

ignores all comparisons. That would only make sense if you thought the value of art-making wasn't merely intrinsic, but also of a magnitude that outweighed every other source of value. This would be an eccentric stance to say the least. Still, the general point holds. If you think that art-making is intrinsically valuable, in the Moorean sense, then valuing it a way that ignores comparisons, trades, and sacrifices is – at least sometimes – an appropriate stance. There is no further thing for whose sake you're engaged in art-making, and therefore you needn't waste time entertaining trades or sacrifices to your art-making that would only make sense if you *were* doing it for the sake of something else.

Second, consider a case of Kantian Intrinsic Valuation. Suppose you think your friendship with someone is intrinsically valuable in the Kantian sense. You believe that it would be a wrong to treat your friendship (or the friend) in an instrumentalized way, i.e. merely as a means to the attainment of some further end. And your ascription of intrinsic value to the friendship marks this verdict. Does it make sense to prioritize and cherish your friendship, in this instance, in a way that ignores comparisons, trades, sacrifices, etc.? Well, again, not always, but sometimes, yes. If someone says to you: “just blow off your friend and come hang out with me, we'll have a better time together”, they're inviting you to view your friend as a mere means to having fun, and they're proposing a more efficacious means to the attainment of that end. It may well be that, on the terms of the consequentialist calculus that they're assuming, you would indeed do better ditching your friend. But it makes sense for you to ignore the offer out of hand all the same. Accepting the offer would mean wronging your friend. By valuing your friendship intrinsically – that is, in a way that is, at least in this case, averse to any value comparisons – you guard yourself against the risk of committing what is, by your own lights, a serious wrong. Again, this doesn't mean it *always* makes sense to value friendship in a way that ignores all comparisons. Again, that would only follow if you believed that the magnitude of friendship's value trumped all other sources of value. But nevertheless, again, the general point holds. If you think the friendship is intrinsically valuable, in the Kantian sense, then valuing it a way that ignores comparisons, trades, and sacrifices is – at least sometimes – appropriate, since it spares you the trouble of deliberating over a choice that, by your own lights, you ought to reject.³⁰

³⁰ I've allowed some ambiguity thus far between two different senses of the term 'appropriate'. If we ascribe x Kantian intrinsic value then it's appropriate to value x in a strong sense, i.e. it's *obligatory* to value x. By contrast, in most cases where we ascribe x Moorean intrinsic value it's appropriate to value x merely in the sense of it being *permissible* to value x. For discussion of this ambiguity in the notions of appropriateness and fittingness, see Michael J. Zimmerman, 'Partiality and Intrinsic Value', *Mind* 120 (2011): 447-83, 449.

7. Why we need constructive intrinsic valuation

The paradigm cases of appropriate intrinsic valuation make sense on paper. But in practice, in many situations in which someone is trying to explain or justify why they are valuing something intrinsically, arguing by appeal to the paradigm case proves difficult.

Let's return to the philosophy example from §2, although instead of thinking of an individual studying philosophy, let's consider someone defending the public subsidization of philosophical research and teaching. When asked to justify the allocation of resources to philosophy – resources that could be spent on things whose benefits seem *prima facie* likely to be greater than whatever benefits philosophy creates – the advocate may be tempted to declare that philosophy is intrinsically valuable. But that assertion is hard to sustain. Are we imputing intrinsic value to philosophy in the Kantian sense? This amounts to claiming that people have a categorical duty to value philosophy non-instrumentally. The Kantian faces big enough challenges defending the premises and inferences that underpin the claim that we have such duties to other human beings. Showing that we have a duty to value philosophy for its own sake is a tall order. Maybe instead we can impute intrinsic value to philosophy in the Moorean sense, declaring that its value isn't derived from anything else, but resides in its own nature? The problem, though, is how to defend this when others dispute it – as they surely will in a competition for finite resources. In contending that x has Moorean intrinsic value, we aren't in a position to argue that “x is valuable because of y”, because it's the nature of ascribing Moorean intrinsic value to say “x is valuable period, not due to anything else”. In terms of dialectical efficacy, a brute assertion that philosophy *doesn't* have intrinsic value carries roughly the same weight as the advocate's claim that it does.

Valuing philosophy intrinsically means treating it as if its value is independent from other sources of value. It involves a *resistance* to assessing philosophy's value in comparative terms, and a *preference* for esteeming it as an activity that doesn't gain its worth thanks to its effects or its relation to other pursuits. If the only way to defend this stance is by ascribing intrinsic value to philosophy then it seems tenuous for the reasons just explained. But our discussion of CIV shows that this isn't the only way to justifying valuing philosophy intrinsically and supporting it accordingly. Philosophy has extrinsic benefits; it expands people's intellectual abilities, creates knowledge, and is a source of enjoyment. If valuing philosophy intrinsically – instead of treating it as amenable to comparative appraisals in terms of its instrumental utility – means that the magnitude of these benefits or the likelihood of them being attained are greater, then philosophy is a fitting object of Constructive Intrinsic Valuation. This exemplifies why CIV is a useful addition to our conceptual repertoire. It is another way to assess – and sometimes, *approve* – intrinsic valuation, despite the difficulties we run into trying to ascribe intrinsic value to the things we value intrinsically.

To be clear, I'm not saying we should be nihilists about intrinsic value.³¹ My point is epistemic rather than metaphysical. I'm saying that even if we grant that some things do have intrinsic value in the Kantian or Moorean sense (or both), it's often hard to justify the ascription of intrinsic value to *particular* entities or states of affairs. This is largely because the kinds of arguments one has to make to try to show that x has intrinsic value aren't the kind that easily compel assent. To ascribe x Moorean intrinsic value I have to argue that x's value doesn't derive from anything else but supervenes on x's own nature or properties. For any value of x, defending this will require an appeal to various *a priori* premises including intuitions about value. Similarly, trying to ascribe Kantian intrinsic value to x will require an appeal to intuitions about value and other *a priori* premises. In short, if I'm trying to justify an ascription of intrinsic value I have to make *philosophical* arguments, which tend to be persistently controversial and limited in their ability to compel assent. This wouldn't matter if people normally had convergent intuitions and judgments regarding questions of value. However, although we do find some convergence in some areas, in many parts of life we see deep and enduring disputes about what's most valuable or what's valuable *per se*.

These difficulties don't matter so much if I'm just deciding what I see as intrinsically valuable by my own lights. The person in my example in §6 who feels that art-making has Moorean intrinsic value needn't worry much about their ability to philosophically substantiate this value-ascription, since they're valuing art-making in a way that expresses their personal prerogatives and doesn't demand anyone else's agreement or cooperation.

However, as the example of publically subsidizing philosophy reminds us, there are many situations in which the intrinsic valuation of something does stand in need of a defense. In these cases a paradigm-case defense of intrinsic valuation is often going to be hard to mount, for the reasons I've been explaining, and making the case for CIV instead might prove to be a more promising justificatory strategy. I'm certainly not suggesting that the case for CIV will always succeed. Sometimes valuing x intrinsically makes no difference to our ability to obtain x's extrinsic benefits. Sometimes this does improve our ability to obtain x's extrinsic benefits, but we can't supply evidence that shows this. Sometimes valuing x intrinsically represents a complete mis-valuation that can't be justified via any line of argument. In short, the concept of CIV isn't a magic bullet that allows for every instance of intrinsic valuation to be vindicated. Rather, it is another tool in our toolkit. In some cases in which an intrinsic valuation cannot be defended as a paradigm instance of appropriate intrinsic valuation, it may yet turn out that it can be defended via an appeal to CIV.

³¹ For an argument to the effect that nothing has Moorean intrinsic value, see Monroe C. Beardsley, 'Intrinsic Value', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 26 (1965): 1-17. For a recent defense of the possibility of Moorean intrinsic value, see Donald H. Regan, 'How to be a Moorean', *Ethics* 113 (2003): 651-77.

I don't think philosophy is an unusual or singular case of something that is valued intrinsically but which we cannot confidently impute intrinsic value to, and whose intrinsic valuation may thus be more persuasively defended by making the case for CIV instead. In a frequently-cited passage, William Frankena reels off a list of things he takes to be properly valued intrinsically, including health, true opinions, self-expression, adventure, and novelty.³² However, for each of these things, (i) it seems dubious to claim that we have a categorical *duty* to value them intrinsically, and (ii) we can easily conceive of their value as being derived from further goods that they contribute to or are associated with. So CIV might prove to be a useful justificatory resource in these cases. In §1 I mentioned another example. Many of us value works of art intrinsically even though (i) we don't think we have a categorical *duty* to value them intrinsically, and (ii) we can readily understand their value as being derived from further goods that they contribute to or are associated with. CIV may be a useful justificatory resource in trying to defend intrinsic valuation in this instance as well. Some higher-stakes cases in which CIV might prove useful are those in which people are attempting to defend the protection, prioritization, or subsidization of things that are rare and endangered. We find a similar justificatory approach when people are defending endangered biological species and threatened ecosystems, as when people are defending the preservation of endangered languages and other cultural entities. The costs of preserving these things is often very high, and often appears to be incommensurate with the benefits that will follow from their preservation. Of course one can – and people do – try to claim that these things have intrinsic value and should be valued accordingly.³³ But such claims face all the problems that I've been describing in this section. CIV represents another line of defense available to those who want to argue for treating these things as if they did possess intrinsic value. It may turn out that these things' extrinsic benefits, such as they are, require that we prioritize or cherish them in a resolutely non-instrumental manner.

Someone might worry that the case I'm making for CIV proves too much. If we're supposed to intrinsically value anything that will be of greater extrinsic value as a result of valuing it intrinsically, we may end up being required to intrinsically value a great multitude of things, which would be unfeasible or undesirable or both. But this unwelcome consequence needn't follow. If *x* is a fitting object of CIV this means we have a *pro tanto* reason to value *x* intrinsically, and this enables

³² William K. Frankena, *Ethics* 2nd Edn (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973): 88.

³³ For examples of this and discussion of related issues, see for instance Rick O'Neil, 'Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species', *Environmental Ethics* 19 (1997): 45-52; Albert W. Musschenga, 'Intrinsic Value as a Reason for the Preservation of Minority Cultures', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 1 (1998): 201-25; Alexei M. Ghilarov, 'Ecosystem Functioning and Intrinsic Value of Biodiversity', *Oikos* 90 (2000): 408-12; John A. Vucetich, Jeremy T. Bruskotter, and Michael Paul Nelson, 'Evaluating Whether Nature's Intrinsic Value is an Axiom of or Anathema to Conservation', *Conservation Biology* 29 (2015): 321-32.

us to counter the charge that someone who values x intrinsically is plainly in error. But this doesn't mean anyone has a duty to value x intrinsically. An account of CIV gives us some supplementary resources for thinking about why we should abandon or cling onto the intrinsic valuing attitudes that we already hold. The question is not: should we cultivate pretences in our valuing attitudes in order to extract more value from things? The question is: where our valuations of things already evince this shape – where we value certain things intrinsically, even though we're doubtful about our ability to defend an ascription of intrinsic value to them – is there anything that can be said on behalf of maintaining this kind of valuing stance? I have tried to show that something can indeed be said for maintaining intrinsic valuations that exemplify this structure.